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SYMPOSIUM ON ABOLISHING CIVIL MARRIAGE: 
AN INTRODUCTION 
Edward Stein* 
The institution of marriage is venerable both because it has existed 
for a long time and because of the role it plays in our culture.  In 
Griswold v. Connecticut, the Supreme Court, in the context of 
discussing “the notions of privacy surrounding . . . marriage”1 as they 
related to a state law regulating contraception, said: 
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights—older 
than our political parties, older than our school system.  Marriage is a 
coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and 
intimate to the degree of being sacred.  It is an association that 
promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in living, not political 
faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects.  Yet it is 
an association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior 
decisions.2 
The venerable institution of marriage has a distinctive Janus-faced 
character, both in the past and in the present: it is at once both public 
and private; it is contractual in nature and yet it creates a civic legal 
status that has implications for third parties.  In 1927, the Supreme 
Court described marriage’s unusual character as follows: 
[W]hilst marriage is often termed by text writers and in decisions of 
courts a civil contract—generally to indicate that it must be founded 
upon the agreement of the parties, and does not require any religious 
ceremony for its solemnization—it is something more than a mere 
contract.  The consent of the parties is of course essential to its 
existence, but when the contract to marry is executed by the 
marriage, a relation between the parties is created which they cannot 
change.  Other contracts may be modified, restricted, or enlarged, or 
entirely released upon the consent of the parties.  Not so with 
marriage.  The relation once formed, the law steps in and holds the 
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 1 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965). 
 2 Id. 
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parties to various obligations and liabilities.  It is an institution, in the 
maintenance of which in its purity the public is deeply interested, for 
it is the foundation of the family and of society, without which there 
would be neither civilization nor progress.3 
Marriage today retains this distinctive legal character and a cultural 
significance, but marriage as a social and legal institution has undergone 
substantial changes over the last one hundred years.  These changes 
involve the extent of gender asymmetries in marriage, the ease of 
dissolving a marriage, the legality and social acceptance of interracial 
marriage, and the connections among sexual activity, marriage, and 
procreation.  Specifically, over the past hundred or so years, gender 
roles in marriage have changed dramatically.  Whereas married women 
at one time could not own property4 and inheritance laws once treated 
married men and married women differently,5 today legally created and 
enforced gender asymmetries in family law have been mostly 
eliminated.6  Additionally, over the years, it has become easier (and 
more common) to get divorced in the United States, as evidenced by the 
shift from a primarily fault-based divorce regime, in which one spouse 
had to show that he or she was wronged by the other spouse in order to 
get a divorce, to a no-fault divorce regime, in which fault is no longer 
an issue with respect to allowing the dissolution of a marriage.7  Also, 
most states in the United States, at some time, prohibited people of 
different races from marrying,8 while all states now allow interracial 
marriages.9  Despite dramatic changes regarding who may marry, the 
benefits and duties of marriage, the rules for dissolving marriage, and 
the social assumptions relating to marriage, this institution has survived 
 
 3 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1927). 
 4 See, e.g., MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA 
(1986). 
 5 See, e.g., CAROLE SHAMMAS ET AL., INHERITANCE IN AMERICA: FROM COLONIAL TIMES 
TO THE PRESENT (1987). 
 6 See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455 (1981) (holding that a state law that allowed 
a husband to unilaterally alienate community property of the marriage violated equal protection 
because it constituted sex discrimination); Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (holding that a state 
law under which husbands but not wives may be required to pay alimony similarly violated equal 
protection).  But cf. Nguyen v. INS, 533 U.S. 53 (2001) (holding that different requirements for 
citizenship based on whether citizen parent was the applicant’s mother or father did not violate 
the equal protection clause). 
 7 See, e.g., NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 79 
(2000); J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF 
DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH CENTURY AMERICA (1997). 
 8 There are twelve exceptions.  Specifically, Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, Minnesota, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Vermont, Wisconsin, Kansas, New Mexico, and Washington 
never had laws restricting interracial marriage.  The last three prohibited interracial marriages 
when they were territories, but repealed such laws when they became states.  The District of 
Columbia also never prohibited interracial marriages.  See PETER WALLENSTEIN, TELL THE 
COURT I LOVE MY WIFE 253-54 (2002). 
 9 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding unconstitutional laws prohibiting interracial 
marriages). 
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and thereby proven to be remarkably adaptable and supple.10 
In the last decade or so, there have been rumblings of another 
dramatic change for marriage.  A legal and political battle has emerged 
around the recognition of relationships between persons of the same 
sex.  Lesbians, gay men, bisexuals, and their allies have argued in courts 
and in legislatures that their relationships deserve legal recognition.11  
Opponents of access to marriage for same-sex couples have proposed 
state and federal laws and amendments to state and federal constitutions 
in order to block some or all recognition of same-sex relationships.12 
Although there are some who have tried to take legal actions to 
resist this trend,13 lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals are building families 
not just by entering relationships, but, in increasing numbers, they are 
raising children.  If the elimination of gender asymmetries in marriage 
and the move to no-fault divorce are two “revolutions” in family law in 
this country, the recognition of same-sex relationships and families may 
well be a third.  On the cusp of this revolutionary moment in family 
law, it is not surprising for scholars to ask deep and foundational 
questions about marriage and the state’s role in relation to it. 
The two main papers for this symposium are written by my 
colleagues Ed Zelinsky and Daniel Crane.  Both of them argue for the 
abolition of civil marriage, decoupling the contractual and the civil 
aspects of marriage.  Ed Zelinsky argues that deregulating marriage 
would be better for marriage because, doing so would create a 
marketplace for alternative marriage contracts created by non-state 
actors.  Creating this marketplace for marriage contracts would have the 
virtue, Zelinsky argues, of strengthening marriage and marriages.  He 
further argues that the abolition civil marriage would have few, if any, 
 
 10 See, e.g., Edward Stein, Past and Present Proposed Amendments to the United States 
Constitution Regarding Marriage, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 611, 663 (2004). 
 11 See, e.g., Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003); Baker v. State, 
744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999); Dean v. Dist. of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307 (D.C. 1995); Baehr v. Lewin, 
852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 588 (Ky. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191 
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971). 
 12 As of this writing, 39 states have either passed laws or amended their constitutions (or done 
both) to prohibit same-sex marriages, to deny recognition of same-sex marriages from other 
jurisdictions, and/or to deny recognition of other types of same-sex relationships.  See, e.g., 
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Anti-Gay Marriage Measures in the United States (Nov. 
15, 2005), available at http://www.thetaskforce.org/downloads/marriagemap.pdf; Andrew 
Koppelman, Interstate Recognition of Same-Sex Civil Unions: A Handbook for Judges, 153 U. 
PA. L. REV. 2143 (2005).  In 1996, the “Defense of Marriage Act,” which defines marriage as 
between one man and one woman and says no state shall be required to recognize a same-sex 
marriage from another jurisdiction, became federal law.  Pub. L. No. 104–199, 110 Stat. 2419 
(1996) (codified at 1 U.S.C. § 7 and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C).  Various federal constitutional 
amendments that would prohibit same-sex marriage have also been proposed.  See, e.g., Stein, 
supra note 10, at 613 n.1 and accompanying text. 
 13 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 63.042(3) (2005) (prohibiting homosexuals from adopting).  This 
law was upheld in Lofton v. Secretary of the Department of Children & Family Services, 358 
F.3d 804 (11th Cir. 2004). 
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substantive deleterious effects and that this legal change would not be as 
radical as it might seem.  Dan Crane reaches the conclusion that we 
should abolish civil marriage from a religion-based argument.  He 
argues that under the Judeo-Christian tradition, marriage is a spiritual 
relationship between two people that is best left alone by the state.  He 
describes the benefits of allowing religious institutions and other non-
state institutions to take care of marriage.  Neither Zelinsky nor Crane 
would abolish the social institution of marriage and, on their views, 
most of the social practices around marriage would be unaltered by their 
proposals.  Further, neither claims that their proposals eliminate the 
state’s involvement with married persons.  Although at one level neither 
paper is concerned with marriage equality for lesbian, gay men and 
bisexuals,14 both papers are written against the current social, political, 
and legal context in which equal access to marriage by same-sex 
couples is part of the “culture war.”15 
Is it appropriate that the debate about marriage equality for 
lesbians, gay men, and bisexuals provides an occasion for proposals to 
abolish civil marriage?  Debates about interracial marriages did not 
produce similar reflections on whether to abolish civil marriage, 
although some early feminist scholars and others who critiqued gender 
asymmetries in marriage did argue for the abolition of marriage.16  
Questioning civil marriage, the public policies that support it, the 
restrictions on it, and the benefits and obligations that flow from it is an 
important and appropriate project for legal scholars.  The subject of this 
symposium, although perhaps spawned by questions about same-sex 
marriage, is orthogonal to those questions. 
Zelinsky and Crane each bring a unique perspective to the question 
of whether civil marriage should be abolished in part because neither is 
a specialist in family law: Zelinksy’s primary scholarly interest 
concerns tax,17 while Crane’s primary scholarly interest is in antitrust 
law.18  Their different scholarly backgrounds and the associated 
disciplinary frameworks provide them with alternative lenses for 
examining civil marriage.  Perhaps as a consequence of their alternative 
disciplinary perspectives, a theme that runs through all three 
commentaries, especially those by Charles Reid and Carol Sanger,19 is 
 
 14 That is, however, a central focus of Nancy Knauer’s commentary on the papers of Crane 
and Zelinsky.  See Nancy Knauer, A Marriage Skeptic Responds to the Pro-Marriage Proposals 
to Abolish Civil Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1261 (2006). 
 15 Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 602 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 16 See, e.g., SIMONE DEBEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX (H.M. Parshley trans. & ed., 1953). 
 17 See, e.g., Edward A. Zelinsky, The Defined Contribution Paradigm, 114 YALE L.J. 451 
(2004). 
 18 See, e.g., Daniel A. Crane, Multiproduct Discounting: A Myth of Nonprice Predation, 72 
U. CHI. L. REV. 27 (2005). 
 19 Charles Reid, And the State Makes Three: Should the State Retain a Role in Recognizing 
Marriage?, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1277 (2006); Carol Sanger, A Case for Civil Marriage, 27 
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that the new legal regimes that would evolve under their proposals 
would not adequately replace current family law, in which civil 
marriage plays a central role.  All three commentators and I, as the 
convener of this symposium, however, agree that the two symposium 
papers are provocative and raise important questions, questions that are 
especially ripe given the current revolutionary moment in family law 
and questions that demand critical engagement. 
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